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MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A CASE STUDY IN THE
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW*
CRAIG L. CARR** AND GARY L. SCOTT***
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the question of whether multilateral treaties create cus-
tomary international law upon coming into force remains controversial,
there is good reason to suppose that they do.' Pressing global problems
demand cooperative solutions, and cooperative solutions are best
achieved by means of the treaty process. Yet treaties bind only those
states that are parties to the treaty, and often the critical number of
parties is not great enough to assure an effective international response
to global problems like environmental degradation. So it is tempting to
assert that multilateral treaties generate an "instant custom" 2 that ob-
* An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Joint Convention of the Mexican
International Studies Association (AMEI) and the International Studies Association
(ISA), Manzanillo, Mexico, December 11-13, 1997.
** Professor, Division of Political Science, Mark 0. Hatfield School of Government, Port-
land State University.
*** Professor, Division of Political Science, Mark 0. Hatfield School of Government,
Portland State University.
1. See e.g., R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 275,(1965-66) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]; ANTHONY
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971) [hereinafter CONCEPT
OF CUSTOM]. But see, Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of
Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (1988). For a cogent debate on the subject of cus-
tomary law formation from treaties see, Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Re-
sponse to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988); Anthony
D'Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489 (1988); A.M. Weisburd, A Re-
ply to Professor D'Amato, 21 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 473 (1988). See also Hiram E. Chodosh,
An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction Between Treaty and Custom-
ary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973 (1995). For a specific discussion of the law-
creating abilities of environmental multilateral treaties see Oscar Schachter, The Emer-
gence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457 (1991); Daniel Bodansky,
Customary (and Not so Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995).
2. See supra note 1 for sources discussing the meaning of "instant custom" and how
multilateral treaties may create instant custom under international law.
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ligates even non-parties to adhere to their terms.
In an earlier article in the Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy we argued that multilateral treaties can in fact generate cus-
tomary international law upon coming into force when three basic con-
ditions are met:
1) A sufficient number of states in the international system accept
the treaty.
2) A significant number of those states whose interests are sub-
stantially affected by the treaty (hereinafter "pertinent states") are par-
ties to the treaty.
3) The treaty does not allow reservations on the part of the par-
ties.
3
We do not intend to repeat our argument here. Instead, we shall
examine the universe of environmental treaties to see which treaties, if
any, qualify as customary international law under our standards. We
do so for two reasons. First, our prospective case study will enable us to
sharpen and refine the standards themselves, thus demonstrating with
some degree of precision how they structure the reach of customary in-
ternational law in one particularly important policy area. Second, the
study should aid a state in understanding its legal obligations to other
states regarding the environment.
We will begin in Part II with a brief review of our three conditions
and a discussion of why we think them necessary for the formation of
customary international law. In Part III we briefly discuss some pre-
liminary matters regarding the formation of instant custom. Then in
Part IV we will arrange the existent multilateral treaties on the envi-
ronment into three categories, viz., those treaties that establish cus-
tomary international law according to our standards, those treaties that
do not, and those troubling cases that remain too close to call from the
standpoint provided by our three conditions.
II. MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The reasons for thinking that multilateral treaties establish cus-
tomary international law upon coming into force derive from the princi-
ple of customary international law itself. Customary practices reach
the status of international law when a large number of the states
within the international system suppose these practices establish ap-
propriate guidelines for the relations of states.4 Presumably, a treaty
3. Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Custom-
ary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71 (1996).
4. See, e.g., G. SCHWARZEWNBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (5th
ed. 1967). For the most influential treatise on the formation of customary law see
D'AMATO, supra note 1.
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relation between a large number of states could be based upon the same
conviction. When this is the case, there is no need to suppose that
treaty requirements must "harden" or "ripen into" customary interna-
tional law.5 The significance which a large segment of the international
community attaches to the provisions of the treaty is evidenced by the
treaty itself. There is, so to speak, nothing that needs to harden; things
are hard enough already.
Nevertheless, one cannot decide abstractly which multilateral trea-
ties qualify as sufficiently "hard"; this requires the establishment of
some criteria capable of guiding judgment on the matter. The three
conditions introduced at the outset are designed to meet this objective
with some degree of specificity. As we shall see, however, these condi-
tions contain an inescapable generality and this means that we cannot
hope to achieve perfect clarity on the question of which multilateral en-
vironmental treaties actually create customary international law. This
problem, however, can be overcome by appeal to the obligatory nature of
international law. We take it as a principle of law that its obligatory
character must be clear. That is, if Treaty X creates a legal obligation,
those subject to Treaty X must be able to understand that they have an
obligation to obey it. If there is some question about Treaty X's status
as law, there is also some question about whether it is obligatory.
Where we cannot say with surety that an obligation exists, there is no
such obligation. So, hard or troublesome cases, we will conclude, do not
make customary international law under our conditions.
The three conditions introduced above are relatively straightfor-
ward. For a multilateral treaty to generate customary international
law upon coming into force, a sufficient number of states must accept it,
a significant number of pertinent states must accept it, and it must not
allow reservations.6 Perhaps the best way to make these conditions
clear is to apply them to a specific area of international concern, like the
environment, with a reasonable number of multilateral treaties that es-
tablish a foundation for international law. Before we turn to the more
applied discussion, however, a few general remarks about our three
conditions are in order.
A. The Number of Parties to the Treaty
The notion of customary international law derives from the general
belief that the shared customary practices of numerous states provide
5. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 1, at 139.
6. Article 2 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines "reservation" in
the following manner: " 'reservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or
named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of
the treaty in their application to that state .. " Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. AJCONF. 39/27, May 23, 1969 reprinted
in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
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reason to suppose that such widely accepted practices deserve to be re-
spected as lawful.7 They meet the criterion of general propriety since
they already regulate the relations of a great many states. Presumably,
the officials of those states adhering to these customary practices have
found them to be appropriate regulations. The condition of general pro-
priety can also be met, however, by numerous states accepting a par-
ticular treaty regulation. Here, too, it is possible to conclude that a
large number of states-in this case the parties to the treaty--consider
the regulations associated with the treaty appropriate for the govern-
ance of inter-state relations. The numerical condition, then, seems a
necessary requirement for any inter-state practice to qualify as custom-
ary international law.8
Nevertheless, the condition is obviously imprecise; how many states
must ratify a multilateral treaty before it can be said to establish cus-
tomary international law?9 It hardly seems reasonable to think that a
modest number of states should be able to bring into force a treaty that
would then obligate the remaining states of the world. On the other
hand, if the number of required states is too large, there is little point to
thinking that multilateral treaties can generate customary interna-
tional law. Few such treaties could hope to receive the general support
required to establish instant custom, and the point would quickly be-
come moot.
Perhaps it is worth noting that the numerical condition raises
problems even in more traditional areas of customary international law
formation. Here, too, we need to consider how many states must adhere
to a custom before it receives the general allegiance required to create
international law. For its part, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has demonstrated an inclination to measure state involvement as perti-
nent to the formation of customary international law without any fur-
ther need to identify a magic number that brings such law into being. 10
If, however, we are to use our conditions as a guide to thinking about
when multilateral treaties form customary international law, we must
do better than this.
Nevertheless, the abstract assertion of a specific number is sure to
seem arbitrary. Moreover, the number of states that are parties to a
particular treaty may not indicate either efficacy or pertinent support.
For example, at this writing only eighty-three states have ratified the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Treaty Convention)." Al-
7. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 1, at 99 passim. See also, Michael
Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an In-
terdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109 (1995).
8. For additional discussion of this point, see Baxter, supra note 1, at 285; D'AMATO,
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, passim.
9. See Scott & Carr, supra note 3, at 86-87.
10. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J.
3, Nos. 51 & 52, at 42 (Feb. 20).
11. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6..
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though this is a sizeable number, it remains less than half of the states
of the world.1 2 However, this may be less important than the fact that
the world's major treaty making states (including the United States
which accounts for 7% of the world's treaties) are not included in this
number. 13 When it comes to the identification of a magic number dem-
onstrating significant support for certain treaty provisions, then, the
question of how many parties there are to the treaty may be less impor-
tant than the question of who these parties are. If all the major treaty
making states ratified the Treaty Convention, the case for thinking it
establishes customary international law would presumably be greater
than it now is.
B. Pertinent States
This point suggests that treaty ratification by certain pertinent
states is a more significant determiner of instant custom than the sheer
number of ratifications. We understand pertinent states to be those
states whose participation in a treaty is required if the treaty is to have
real meaning and a real chance of achieving its intended objective. 14 In
the case of the Treaty Convention, for example, pertinent states would
be the major treaty making states. Absent their involvement, it seems
pointless to insist that the Treaty Convention establishes customary
international law governing the treaty process.
Another apt illustration of the pertinent state requirement is the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL).'1 By 1990, parties to MARPOL accounted for 85% of gross
merchant tonnage. 16 At present, however, fewer than half of the world's
states have ratified MARPOL, and yet 85% of the world's significant
shipping states are included among those parties.' 7 The number of per-
tinent state parties thus looks more than sufficient to conclude that
IARPOL establishes customary international law.
The number of identifiable pertinent states will vary according to
the treaty and the issue in question. Depending upon the issue, some
multilateral treaties may have few pertinent state parties, but if the
number is sufficient to demonstrate a clear consensus among pertinent
states, and if our first condition is satisfied, then there is reason to
12. POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD (Arthur S. Banks & Thomas C. Muller eds.,
1998) (listing 193 sovereign states currently in existence).
13. 1 PETER H. ROHN, WORLD TREATY INDEX 111-17 (2d ed. 1984).
14. See Scott & Carr, supra note 3, at 90.
15. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP.35, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter
MARPOL].
16. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A
SURVEY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 161 (Peter H. Sand ed. 1992).
17. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE
WORLD: OCEANGOING STEAM AND MOTOR SHIPS OR 1,000 GROSS TONS AND OVER AS OF
JANUARY 1, 1987 (1988).
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think the treaty establishes customary international law. In other
cases, of course, there may be a great many pertinent states, and this
raises another numbers problem. How many pertinent states are re-
quired to ratify a multilateral treaty before it establishes customary in-
ternational law? Once again, it seems foolish to suppose we can identify
a magic number. One must examine individual treaties to get some
sense of the significance of the involvement of pertinent states. In cer-
tain instances we may be unable to make a clear determination of that
involvement. In those situations we can only say that multilateral
treaty formation of instant custom is presently doubtful. However,
doubtfulness is a form of exactness; such treaties cannot be said to cre-
ate instant custom.
One might object that, by placing such great weight on pertinent
states in determining whether multilateral treaties create instant cus-
tom, we turn efficacy into a condition of lawfulness. If enough pertinent
states adhere to some regulation, by virtue of treaty agreement, then
the fact that the treaty proves efficacious determines its lawfulness.
One might wonder, however, about the significance of thinking that an
efficacious treaty should obligate states whose people have less at stake
with regard to the regulations in question. One might also wonder why
efficacy should count as a condition of lawfulness.
We are not arguing, however, that efficacy does imply lawfulness.
Efficacy is a test of the viability of a particular multilateral treaty. In
the event a significant number of pertinent states regulate themselves
by means of a common treaty agreement, we can suppose that the
regulation demonstrates established practice among those states com-
monly involved in such matters. That is, we can suppose that the
treaty indicates what has become the perceived proper mode of associa-
tion in the area in question. It is in this sense that the treaty generates
customary international law. For it is now easy to see that the treaty
provisions codify, so to speak, the regulations that the most relevant
states think appropriate for the inter-state system. The treaty yields
the same results that would be achieved by the evolution of custom un-
der more traditional standards of customary international law.
Efficacy, then, is an indication of significant general acceptance.
And it escapes the danger of inter-state tyranny by establishing that a
majority of uninterested states cannot legally impose unwanted regula-
tions on states with a stake in some regulatory field. Moreover, since
not all pertinent states may be parties to the treaty making instant cus-
tom, the force of the law remains significant. In the event a pertinent
state refused to ratify a multilateral treaty that managed, nevertheless,
to create instant custom, this state would still be obligated under inter-
national law to adhere to the terms of the treaty. The multilateral
treaty process thus becomes an important mechanism for the self-
regulation of pertinent states in issue areas that matter to them.
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C. Reservations
Our third condition will be familiar enough to those who have con-
sidered the question of whether multilateral treaties create instant cus-
tom. It has been noted by Richard Baxter, and subsequently formalized
by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. There, the Court
stated that any treaty provision subject to state reservations could not
create customary international law.18
Of the three conditions, the reservation condition is by far the most
stringent and will no doubt severely limit the number of multilateral
treaties that generate instant custom. However, the reason for insist-
ing upon this condition is clear. Treaties allowing reservations permit
parties to exempt themselves from those provisions they prefer not to
accept. Any provision that a party to the treaty can treat as not apply-
ing to itself can hardly become customary international law that obli-
gates states which do not have a similar opportunity to reject. It is
hardly appropriate to suppose that non-parties should be obligated to
adhere to provisions of a treaty that the parties themselves are not ob-
ligated to obey. It is also unreasonable to suppose that a party to a
treaty incurs an obligation to obey a provision that it exempts itself
from through the reservation process because the treaty has created in-
stant custom. To insist that multilateral treaties that allow reserva-
tions can still make instant custom, then, seems both unfair to non-
parties and contradictory. It is contradictory because it encourages us
to assert that a party to a treaty may have an obligation to obey a
treaty provision from which it has formally and permissibly exempted
itself.
III. TREATY PROVISIONS AND THE FORMATION OF INSTANT CUSTOM
Before we begin to measure instant customary environmental law
by our standards, two preliminary comments are in order. First, it is
important to be clear about what kinds of customary international law
can be derived from multilateral treaty provisions. There are several
hundred multilateral treaties in force that are relevant to the interna-
tional environmental legal regime. These treaties are both global and
regional in scope. However, by our count only forty-one of these envi-
ronmental treaties, presently in force, are global in scope; the remain-
der are regional. For purposes of our analysis then, we will focus only
on these forty-one global multilateral treaties that have the potential of
sufficiently wide participation to become part of customary interna-
tional law. We will not address, at this time, the ancillary question of
whether regional treaties can create regional customary international
law.
Admittedly this omits many important regional multilateral trea-
18. Baxter, supra note 1, at 284; North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 10, at 42.
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ties and overlooks the possibility of the formation of a regional custom-
ary international law. It also overlooks the possibility of groupings of
similar bilateral treaties forming the basis for customary international
law, particularly on a regional basis. 19 The question of regional cus-
tomary law formation, however, involves the necessity of a theoretical
discussion of a different sort and is beyond the purview of the present
research.
20
Secondly, it is necessary to emphasize that before a treaty provision
can become part of customary international law, it must be of a gener-
alizable nature. 21 Thus, for example, a treaty provision generally de-
signed to protect endangered species by discouraging trade would be
generalizable, 22 while a specific provision, say, to require an import
permit for Loxodonta Africana may not.
23
Treaty provisions may also be part of the process 24 of the formation
of customary international law by providing further evidence for the
existence of certain provisions which may qualify as customary interna-
tional law, but which have, prior to their incorporation into a general
multilateral treaty, not had much supporting evidence as proof of their
existence. Provisions, such as the sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedus
principle and the precautionary principle in environmental law, 25 may
require the backing of multilateral treaties to further solidify their ba-
sis as accepted customary international law. These questions, however,
are also beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we examine the issue
of customary international law formation or "instant custom" as a result
of a multilateral treaty coming into force.
19. D'Amato points out that by sheer numbers alone bilateral treaties must be taken
as evidence of customary international law. He states, "[y]et, as I argued in my book on
custom in 1971, if we look at the matter mathematically, a multilateral convention among
ten states is the equivalent of forty-five similarly worded bilateral treaties among the
same ten states." D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 1, at 99. On regional or
"special custom," see, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Special Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY 157-61 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
20. For a discussion on regional law in the Americas see, Donna Lee Van Cott, Re-
gional Environmental Law in the Americas: Assessing the Contractual Environment, 26 U.
MIAMI INT'L AM. L. REV. 489 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Baxter, Multilateral Treaties, supra note 1; D'AMATO, supra note 1.
22. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 1976 UNTS 244, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S 8249, U.K.T.S. No. 101
(1976), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973); [hereinafter CITES].
23. Id. at Appendix I.
24. While it is traditional to view customary international law and treaties as
sources" of international law, we think it more useful for our discussion to adopt George
Schwarzenberger's terminology of "law creating processes." See SCHWARZENBERGER, su-
pra note 4, at 28-35.
25. The precautionary principle requires states to act with caution toward potentially
environmentally damaging practices, i.e. to err on the side of caution.
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We are interested, then, in the extent to which certain multilateral
treaties can be said to be formative of customary international law on
their own, rather than through a contribution to the normal processes
of opinio juris and state practice.
IV. THE FORMATION OF INSTANT CUSTOM: A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
For purposes of our analysis we will divide the relevant universe
of global multilateral treaties into three categories. Category I will be
those treaties that definitely do not meet our three part test for the
formation of customary international law. Category II will include
those treaties that seem quite clearly to meet our test and Category III
will consist of those treaties about which some doubt may still remain
even after applying our test. This latter category is the most interest-
ing because it illustrates the difficulty, even with the application of a
strict test, of being certain that a treaty creates customary interna-
tional law.
A. Category I
Most of the treaties in our Category I have failed to meet the most
onerous condition of our three conditions set out above, that the treaty
not allow reservations to its substantive provisions. We consider that
all treaties not specifically prohibiting reservations allow them to take
place. In this line of reasoning we are following the stipulations of Arti-
cle 19 of the Treaty Convention.26 Moreover, the ICJ in its advisory
opinion in, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide,27 upheld the notion that reservations,
not specifically prohibited, are allowable so long as the reservation is
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.28
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 6. Article 19 states,
A state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) the res-
ervation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides that
only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation
in question, may be made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.
Id.
27. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). For a similar opinion directly relevant to the Ameri-
cas see, Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, The Effect of Reservations on the
Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37
(1983). For a discussion of reservations to multilateral treaties see generally, Catherine
Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General Multi-
lateral Treaties, 64 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L. L. 245 (1994).
28. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, supra note 27, at 29.
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Although the "no reservations provision" is quite restrictive, 29 the
Court has indicated that the derivation of customary law from treaty
law is a result, "not lightly to be regarded as having been attained."
30
Even so, some may object that we have excluded treaties that many
think have become part of customary international law, but, for reasons
to be discussed below, we think that most of this customary law may
have come about, not through the treaty process itself, but rather
through the more traditional formative processes of customary interna-
tional law, i.e., opiniojuris and state practice.
One such treaty is MARPOL.31 MARPOL's 1978 revision has a to-
tal of 106 Parties. 32 While this represents only slightly fewer than half
of the world's states, as noted above, it represents 85% of the world's
significant shipping states and over 93% of the world's gross merchant
tonnage. 33 This wide acceptance among shipping states has caused
Birnie and Boyle to proclaim, "It is thus beyond question that it is now
included in the 'generally accepted international rules and standards'
prescribed by Article 211 of the 1982 UNCLOS as the minimum content
of the flag state's duty to exercise diligent control of its vessels in the
prevention of marine pollution."34 In spite of such.claims, we have in-
cluded MARPOL in our Category I because it does not prohibit reserva-
tions to its provisions. While no reservations have been made to date,
the treaty, nonetheless, offers the possibility of a state opting out of or
modifying certain provisions through reservation. While we do not dis-
agree that MARPOL's provisions may have come to be regarded as cus-
tomary international law, they have done so because of the normal pro-
cesses included in the creation of customary international law, state
practice and opinio juris. As Birnie and Boyle point out, "Moreover,
quite apart from their incorporation by treaty, such international stan-
dards may acquire customary force, if international support is suffi-
ciently widespread and representative. The MARPOL Convention may
be one example of this transformation process."35
Another environmental treaty that may have evolved into custom-
ary law, but which we also include in Category I because it does not
prohibit reservations, is The International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling ("Whaling Convention"), done originally in 1946 and
amended nine times between 1975 and 1992.36 Since 1979, this conven-
29. The no reservations test eliminates 31 of the 41 global environmental treaties un-
der consideration for this study.
30. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 10, at 41
31. MARPOL, supra note 15.
32. See Llloyd's Register of ShippingfWorld Fleet statistics, Dec.31, 1997 (noting 106
parties to MARPOL).
33. Sand, supra note 16, at 161.
34. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 267 (1992).
35. Id. at 94.
36. International Convention for the Regulation of. Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, 62 STAT. 1716, T.I.A.S. 1849 [hereinafter Whaling Convention].
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tion, which had only eight original parties, and which added only eight
more in the succeeding three decades, has gained thirty additional par-
ties in the past two decades.
37
Participation in the Whaling Convention has certainly gained mo-
mentum during a period of heightened environmental consciousness.
This momentum has caused some writers to assert that the generaliz-
able provisions of this treaty, e.g., the protection of whales in general,
have become part of customary international law. 38 D'Amato and
Chopra argue that customary law regarding whales has evolved so far
that whales can be seen as having an emerging "entitlement to life."
39
We do not consider the Whaling Convention itself, however, to be
formative of customary international law, because, as noted above, it
does not prohibit reservations. Further, states may opt out of the
regular amendments to the Schedule to the Convention which establish
specific conservation regulations on whaling.40 Moreover, it should be
noted that participation in the Whaling Convention, while growing, still
does not include nearly two-thirds of the world's coastal states. 41 To
what extent this limits the treaty from constituting customary interna-
tional law under our test is a moot point, since the treaty fails our no-
reservations test. It would become an issue only if the treaty did pro-
hibit reservations.
The Whaling Convention, then, may have evolved into customary
international law through the normal practices of the expression of
opinio juris and state practice. Indeed, D'Amato and Chopra argue that
there has been, "... a broadening international consciousness about
whaling amounting to an opinio juris - the psychological component of
international customary law."42 And further, "When this component is
added to the evolving practices of states toward whaling, the combina-
tion of psychological and material elements arguably constitutes bind-
ing customary law."43 We do not dispute this claim, nor would we argue
that the Whaling Convention has not contributed to the formation of
this law in subtle ways. Rather, we argue that the Whaling Convention
itself did not create the customary law on the subject of whaling. Fur-
ther evidence that the Whaling Convention and MARPOL became cus-
tomary international law through non-treaty processes is the length of
time that passed before these customary law principles gained their
present widespread acceptance. The Whaling Convention, in particu-
37. Treaty data from the UNTS website (last modified November 10, 1997)
<http://www.un.orgDeptsTreaty>.
38. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales, Their Emerging Right to Life, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 49 (1991). See also, Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Toward a Developing
Right of Survival as Part of an Ecosystem, 17 DENy. J. INT'L L. & PoLy 255 (1989).
39. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 49.
40. Whaling Convention, supra note 36, at art. V(3). See also, Sand, supra note 16.
41. Sand, supra note 16, at 258.
42. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 38, at 22.
43. Id. at 22-23.
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lar, languished in relative obscurity for nearly thirty years before the
rise in environmental consciousness of the past two decades.
These are but two examples of environmental treaties often seen as
having "hardened into" customary international law, even though they
do not meet the requirements of our three part test. They illustrate the
distinction between treaties which create customary international law
and those which merely contribute to its formation by aiding the proc-
esses of opinio juris and state practice. Treaties in our next category
are examples of the former, that is, they meet the standards of our
three part test. Thus, we think that they are formative of customary
international law in the form of "instant custom."
B. Category H
There are only ten global multilateral environmental treaties pres-
ently in force which do not allow reservations to their provisions, all of
which are discussed below. Of these, eight belong to our second cate-
gory, i.e., they seem rather clearly to meet our three part test. The fol-
lowing brief discussion of each of these treaties should make this clear.
The Convention on Biological Diversity came into force on Decem-
ber 29, 1993. 4 4 Its purpose is to slow the reduction of biological diver-
sity caused by human activities. 45 The means to do this described in the
Convention include ".... the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources,... transfer of rele-
vant technologies.... and by appropriate funding."46 There are 175
parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 47 Thus, 90% of the
world's states subscribe to the principles contained therein. While bio-
logical diversity concerns all states of the world, the treaty provisions
for sharing technology 48 and providing funding to the developing
states49 suggest that the pertinent states are the major industrialized
and technologically developed states. All major developed states, except
the United States, are parties to this convention.50 The United States
signed the treaty in 1993, but has yet to ratify it. s 1 We do not consider
the absence of a US ratification of this particular convention to consti-
tute sufficient reason to deny the formation of customary international
44. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC.5/4, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biological Diversity Convention].
45. Id.
46. Id. at art. 1.
47. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, United Nations, New
York, ST/LEG/SER.E (visited Feb. 25, 1999), <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty>.
48. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 44, at art. 16.
49. Id. at art. 20.
50. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
See also List of Signatories, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1004 (1992). (as of June 29, 1992, 157
states and the European Economic Community had signed the treaty).
51. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
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law by this treaty on the basis of our pertinent states test. The US sig-
nature constitutes an interim acceptance of the principles contained in
the treaty, so one could argue that the US is, in one sense, agreeable to
laws formulated by this treaty. This line of reasoning, however, is
probably unnecessary. The issue of biodiversity is sufficiently broad
based so that the absence of a single large and wealthy state should not
hinder customary law formation. With 170 parties, including most of
the world's technologically developed states, and most of its developing
states, this treaty meets both the sufficient numbers and pertinent
states conditions. We believe this convention is an important step in
the establishment of customary international law on the matter of bio-
logical diversity and that the remaining non-parties should consider its
provisions as definitive in this area.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change ("Climate Change
Convention") came into force on March 21, 199452 and at present it has
177 members. As in many of the environmental treaties, the developed
states are the pertinent states in the Climate Change Convention.
Those states which contribute the most to anthropogenic emissions re-
sponsible for global climate change, must naturally be "on board" for
any solutions to global climate change problems. In recognition of this
there are several provisions in the Convention calling for special contri-
butions from developed states. Article 3.1 calls for developed countries
to ".... take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse ef-
fects thereof."53 Article 4.4 requires the developed countries to ".. . as-
sist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those
adverse effects."5 4 Article 4.5 further requires developed states to "...
take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appro-
priate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies
and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Par-
ties. . .."55
Most of the world's developed states are parties to the Climate
Change Convention, including The United States, Japan, The Russian
Federation and The European Union states.56 It can be said then that
the Framework Convention on Climate Change meets both our wide ac-
ceptance test and our pertinent states test and thus forms instant cus-
tom.
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer which
entered into force in September of 198857 and the subsequent Montreal
52. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 237/18 (Part II) Add.1 and
Corr.1, reprinted in 31 LL.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
53. Id. at art. 3.1
54. Id. at art. 4.4.
55. Id. at art. 4.5.
56. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
57. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which entered
into force in January 1989,58 both received widespread acceptance
rather rapidly. This was probably due to the urgency felt on the part of
most states once a hole was discovered in the ozone layer by British sci-
entists.59 The Vienna Convention presently has 169 parties 60 and the
Montreal Protocol has 163 parties.6 1 These parties include all of the
major industrial states and the major producers and consumers of ozone
depleting substances, primarily Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Thus, the
pertinent states are all parties to these two treaties that aim to limit
the emissions of stratospheric ozone depleting chemicals. These two
treaties on ozone depletion exemplify the theory that multilateral trea-
ties can create instant customary international law.
The International Convention to combat Desertification in those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, par-
ticularly in Africa, 62 came into force on December 26, 1996.63 While the
focus is on African areas, primarily because of the severe problems ex-
perienced there, it is, nonetheless, of interest on a more global basis.
There are a total of 146 parties to this convention, 64 giving it reasonably
widespread acceptance. The pertinent states to this treaty are those
states most experiencing desertification problems, and the developed
states, because of the special provisions in the treaty calling for them to
aid states experiencing desertification. 65 In regard to pertinent state
participation, most of the states with drought or desertification prob-
lems are parties to the treaty. For example, the states of the Sahelian
region of Africa, which consists mostly of drylands, are all parties to the
treaty.66 The developed states are well represented as parties to the
Convention as well. 67 Given the relatively widespread participation in
the Convention and the high percentage of participation of the perti-
U.N.T.S. 293, 324, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
58. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in
26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
59. See Gary L. Scott et. Al., Success and Failure Components of Global Environ-
mental Cooperation: The Making of International Environmental Law, 2 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 23, 46-58 (1995).
60. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
61. See id.
62. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experi-
encing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 241/15/Rev.7, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994) [hereinafter The Desertifica-
tion Convention].
63. U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev.3 (Sept. 12, 1994).
64. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
65. The Desertification Convention, supra note 47, at art. 6.
66. See Kyle W. Danish, International Environmental Law and the "Bottom-Up" Ap-
proach: A Review of the Desertification Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL. STUD. 133,
136 (1995). The states are Cape Verde, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger,
Chad, and Sudan. See id.
67. The authors note that most of the European Union States have ratified the Con-
vention. Two notable absentees from the developed state parties are the United States
and Japan. Both states, however, are signatories.
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nent states, it can be said that the Desertification Convention meets
each of our tests for becoming customary international law.
This brings us to The International Tropical Timber Agreement of
198368 and its successor agreement, the International Tropical Timber
Agreement of 1994.69 For purposes of our discussion, we will treat them
as a single agreement, focusing primarily on the successor agreement.
While these agreements are more commodities agreements than envi-
ronmental agreements, they are, nonetheless, concerned with the pres-
ervation of tropical forests and thus can be classed as falling within the
purview of the international environment. They have been generally
treated as environmental treaties in the relevant literature.7 0 Moreo-
ver, they are the only international agreements focused on forests, and
the 1994 successor agreement does have more of an "environmental fla-
vor" than the 1983 Agreement. 71 Presently there are 54 parties to the
1983 agreement and 54 parties to the 1994.agreement.
7 2
While it may seem questionable whether these agreements have
achieved sufficient participation worldwide such that they have created
instant customary international law, they present a somewhat different
problem in this area. Rather than taking the participation in the trea-
ties as a percentage of all of the world's states, it should be noted that
only a small percentage of the world's states are concerned with the ex-
port of tropical timber and only a slightly larger percentage with its im-
port. Because most of the timber producing states and also a large per-
centage of the major timber consumers are parties,73 the treaties
contain sufficient breadth of participation and sufficient pertinent state
participation to warrant consideration as formative of customary inter-
national law regarding the conservation of tropical forests. Therefore,
since these treaties allow no reservations, have sufficient pertinent
state participation, and arguably meet the breadth of participation re-
quirement as well, these treaties must be considered as formative of
customary international environmental law according to our three part
68. International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, U.N. Doc.
TD/TIMBEI11I/Rev.1 (1984), reprinted in 1393 U.N.T.S. 67 (1985).
69. International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 10, 1994, UNCTAD:
Doc.TDITIMBER. 2/Misc. 7/GE. 94_50830 reprinted in 33 IL.M. 1014 (1994).
70. See, e.g., Nicholas Guppy, International Governance and Regimes Dealing with
Land Resources from the Perspective of the North, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 169, 177-80 (Oran R. Young et. al. eds., 1992); Rodolfo
Rendon, Regimes Dealing with Biological Diversity from the Perspective of the South, in
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 141-42 (Oran R.
Young et. al. eds., 1992); Ann Hooker, The International Law of Forests, 34 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 823, 849 (1994).
71. The 1983 Agreement contains only one paragraph among its "Objectives" which
relates to environmental concerns. International Tropical Timber Agreement, supra note
53, ch. 1, art.1. The 1994 Agreement contains 6 paragraphs which refer to various envi-
ronmental concerns such as sustainable development, conservation, and enhancement of
resources. Id..
72. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
73. Id.
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test.
These agreements, however, offer an excellent example of why one
should not be sanguine about an environmental issue, even though one
can see that customary law has been formed regarding that issue.
What is troublesome about these agreements is the way in which they
have been structured and the results that this has had for the regula-
tion of the destruction of tropical forests. Because of the weighted vot-
ing scheme within the International Tropical Timber Organization,
which gives the most votes to the largest timber producing and con-
suming states, 74 the results have not been as many environmentalists
had hoped. According to Nicholas Guppy, "In practice, therefore, the
destruction of tropical forests is promoted by both sides, while the tropi-
cal timber market continues in a state of uncertainty and is manipu-
lated by the main buyers - especially Japan - to keep prices low."
75
Therefore, while the clauses in these treaties relating to the conserva-
tion of tropical forests may have become part of customary international
law, in practice the treaties and their parties are doing relatively little
to preserve this resource that is so important to global environmental
health. Simply knowing that customary international law has been
created on this matter may breed false optimism concerning the future
of tropical forests.
76
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)77
presents another interesting study. While there is no doubt that
UNCLOS incorporates many heretofore accepted principles of custom-
ary international law, such as the freedom of the high seas, coastal
state sovereignty over territorial waters, etc., it also represents a sig-
nificant departure from some of the older concepts of the traditional law
of the sea. For example, UNCLOS was the first treaty to give legal
credibility to the shift from res nullius to res communis regarding the
resources of the seas.78
Many authors have proclaimed that UNCLOS is formative of cus-
74. Guppy, supra note 70, at 141.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also, Hooker, supra note 70; Tom Rudel & Jill Roper, The Paths to Rain
Forest Destruction: Crossnational Patterns of Tropical Deforestation, 1975-1990, 25
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 53 (1997); Emmanuel Kasimbazi, Sustainable Development in In-
ternational Tropical Timber Agreements, 14 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 137 (1997);
Phillip E. Wilson Jr., Barking up the Right Tree: Proposals for Enhancing the Effective-
ness of the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 10 Temp. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 229
(1996).
77. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. AICONF.621122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
78. See, e.g., the Preamble to UNCLOS which states, inter alia, "...that the area of
the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and
exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole .... Id
See also UNCLOS, part XI, art. 140.
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tomary international law and that res communis is now the accepted
view of the international community.7 9 When this question is viewed
against the background supplied by our instant custom test, this under-
standing of UNCLOS seems justified. Let us explain.
It should be noted, first, that UNCLOS meets our "no reservations"
test. Further, UNCLOS has gained rather widespread acceptance
among the world's states. At present there are 130 parties to the Con-
vention.
80
The pertinent states test is the issue that may make UNCLOS
somewhat questionable regarding its formation of customary interna-
tional law. It seems reasonable to regard those states with the largest
blue water navies and those states with the world's largest gross ton-
nage of shipping as our pertinent states. Though nearly all states have
an interest in UNCLOS, particularly with its res communis principle
regarding the high seas and the adjacent subsoil, those states most af-
fected will be the major shipping and naval powers.
Considering UNCLOS as a candidate for the formation of custom-
ary law in 1994, the year of the Agreement on the implementation of
Part XI of UNCLOS, the prospects were not good. 81 At that time only
one of the top ten naval powers 82 and only three of the top ten mer-
chant shipping states83 had ratified the treaty. Part XI of UNCLOS be-
came the most controversial part of the Convention. In an effort to
make this part of the treaty more palatable to the major maritime
states, and thus to achieve universal participation in UNCLOS, the
79. For a discussion of the historical progress from res nullius to res communis see,
e.g., W. Frank Newton, Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea Determinant, 16 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 369 (1981). See also, A. L. Morgan, The New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implica-
tions for Sovereign Jurisdiction and Freedom of Action, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L. L. 5, 19
(1996); Christopher C. Joyner & Elizabeth A. Martell, Looking Back to See Ahead:
UNCLOS III and Lessons for Global Commons Law, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 73 (1996);
David L. Larson, Conventional, Customary, and Consensual Law in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 75 (1994), Philip Allott, Mare
Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 764 (1992).
80. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
81. Part XI of UNCLOS deals with the establishment of the deep seabed authority.
Article 136 of Part XI establishes that the seabed and its resources are the "common heri-
tage of mankind." UNCLOS, supra note, 77, at art. 136. Part XI was not well received
among those states that had the seabed. The supplemental agreement which modified
certain parts of Part XI seems to have assuaged most of the concerns of these states. See
GERHARD VON LAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 399-403 (7th ed. 1996) (for a discussion of the particular objections and the modifica-
tions to Part Xl).
82. The top ten naval powers are extrapolated from the INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
AND DEFENSE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1941 and passim (Trevor N. Dupuy ed., 1993). They are 1.
USA, 2. Russia, 3. UK, 4. France, 5. Japan, 6. Argentina, 7. Brazil, 8. India, 9. Spain, 10.
China. Only Brazil had ratified UNCLOS by 1994.
83. The top ten shipping states by gross tonnage are taken from Dupuy: These states
are 1. Liberia, 2. Panama, 3. Japan, 4. Greece, 5. Cyprus, 6. USA, 7. Russia, 8. China, 9.
Philippines, 10. Bahamas. Of these states only Cyprus, Philippines, and Bahamas had
ratified UNCLOS. Id. at 1729.
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General Assembly adopted the Agreement on the implementation of
Part XI and put it forward for signature and ratification.84 That it has
largely achieved its desired effect is evidenced by the fact that 63 states
have become parties to UNCLOS since the implementation of this sup-
plemental agreement in 1994.85
In the wake of the supplemental agreement, all of the naval powers
with the exception of the United States, and all of the major shipping
states with the exception of the United States and Liberia, have become
parties to UNCLOS. 86 Does this constitute sufficient participation by
the pertinent states to declare that UNCLOS formulates customary in-
ternational law and that its provisions therefore govern all states with
respect to the sea?
The significance of the non-participation of the United States and
Liberia cannot be minimized in considering this question. The United
States is, by a considerable degree, the largest naval presence in the
world.87 Further, Liberia is the number one shipping state in the world
by a large margin.88 Liberia's absence from UNCLOS, coupled with the
absence of the United States (not only the largest naval power, but a
significant shipping power as well) at least raises some doubt about the
ultimate effectiveness of the treaty or the customary international law
formulated by the treaty.
It is necessary to clarify, then, whether the point behind our second
condition is efficacy or general consensus. There is little doubt that the
participation of pertinent states in a multilateral treaty is necessary if
the treaty is to prove effective. However, effectiveness is a poor condi-
tion of lawfulness. As UNCLOS demonstrates, even in the category of
pertinent states, some states may be more pertinent than others. To
conclude that it is doubtful that UNCLOS establishes instant custom is
to allow the most pertinent states on a question of treaty law to have a
de facto veto over the issue of instant custom. This seems inconsistent,
however, with the traditional view that customary practice can harden
into international law because it demonstrates a general consensus that
some regulation ought to be respected by all states. After all, custom-
ary international law is supposed to hold against all states and not
permit the claim of res inter alios acta by any single actor.
Our pertinent state category does not deviate from this view; in-
stead, it effectuates this view by adding a degree requirement to the is-
sue of customary practice. Consensus on the propriety of a regulation,
among states with a heightened involvement in a particular practice,
supports the regulation in ways relevant to the formation of customary
84. G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 36, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/263 (1994).
85. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
86. Id.
87. Dupuy, supra note 82.
88. Id. at 1729.
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international law. When it comes to instant custom, this means that a
high degree of consensus among pertinent states is required for a find-
ing of instant custom.
A high degree of consensus, however, can fall short of unanimity. If
enough pertinent states participate in a multilateral treaty, the non-
participation of one or two should not affect the formation of instant
.custom, regardless of what this might do to the treaty's efficacy. Given
the involvement of other pertinent states, then, we think the non-
participation of the United States and Liberia does not stop UNCLOS
from formulating customary international law. The United States,
however, has signed the Agreement relating to the implementation of
Part XI of the Convention and continues to be a provisional member of
the International Seabed Authority. 89
C. Category III
We now turn to those treaties that present difficulty in determining
their qualifications as customary international law makers, even when
viewed through our three part test. We have included only two treaties
in this category.
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal ("Basel Convention") came into
force on May 5, 1992.90 Presently there are 122 parties to this treaty,91
a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the world's states.
The purposes of the Basel Convention are first, to limit and control the
transboundary movement of those materials set for disposal that are
deemed by the convention to be of a hazardous nature, and second, to
transfer technology to the lesser developed countries so that they may
better be able to minimize the production of such hazardous waste and
to minimize the handling and disposal problems of those wastes that
are generated.
92
Since most of these hazardous materials are the result of industrial
and manufacturing processes, and since the technology transfers de-
89. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. A/RES.481263 (1994). The
United States signed the Agreement on July 29, 1994. The effect of the initial signature
was to become a provisional member of the ISBA until November 16, 1996. In accordance
with Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and by its own request, the US provisional
membership in the ISBA has been extended to November 16, 1998. (Doc. ISBA/C/9).
90. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEPIWG.190/4, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. For a discussion of the Basel Conven-
tion specific to Latin America see, Gonzalo Biggs, Latin America and the Basel Convention
on Hazardous Wastes, 5 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 333 (1994).
91. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
92. Basel Convention, supra note 90, preamble.
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pend upon the technologically developed states, it would seem that the
pertinent states in this particular convention must be the most ad-
vanced industrial states of the world. The Basel Convention has been
quite successful in attracting members from this category of states. All
members of the EU, along with Japan, Peoples' Republic of China, the
Russian Federation and several other highly industrialized states are
parties to the treaty.
93
The one notable absentee from the major industrialized parties to
the treaty is the United States, which has signed, but not ratified the
treaty.94 (The US Senate consented to the ratification of the Basel Con-
vention in August 1992; however, the Congress has not yet passed the
domestic legislation necessary to comply with the treaty obligations.)
95
As noted already, the non-participation of a single pertinent state is not
sufficient to conclude that a treaty fails to make instant custom. Once
again, however, the absence of the United States raises questions of ef-
ficacy. The United States is the largest producer and one of the largest
transporters of hazardous waste materials. 96 Of course, the signature
of the United States on this document does indicate interim approval of
its provisions, and given the often slow legislative process in the United
States, ratification may yet be forthcoming. Still, the present status of
this treaty with the US missing from the parties raises serious doubts
about its general efficacy.
Nevertheless, the absence of the US alone does not disqualify the
treaty from establishing instant custom, for the same reasons presented
in our discussion of UNCLOS. 97 There is, however, another relevant is-
sue here. With the participation of only about 60% of the world's states
in the Basel Convention, 98 there is reason to question whether our first
93. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
94. Presently, the United States is the only member of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (hereinafter OECD) that has failed to become a party to
the Basel Convention. See, e.g., <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/fin> (last modified Nov.
10, 1997).
95. Biggs, supra note 90, at 357.
96. See, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSFRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: 1992-93 STATISTICS 10-11 (1997).
According to the OECD Report, "[d]ue to differences in national definitions of hazardous
wastes, great caution should be exercised when using these figures." For example, "[t]he
difference between the waste generation figures for US and Europe arises largely because
the US defines large quantities of dilute wastewaters as hazardous wastes while in
Europe, these materials are managed under water protection regulations." Id. A further
difficulty in comparing the statistics is that the reporting year for the various OECD
states varies considerably, with Austria reporting 1995 waste generation statistics and
Spain reporting them from 1985. All other states fall somewhere in between. The United
States waste generation statistics are for 1993. Even with all of the difficulties of com-
parison, however, the fact that the United States hazardous waste generation is nearly
80% of the total OECD waste generation surely makes the United States the largest pro-
ducer of hazardous waste materials.
97. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
98. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
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condition is satisfied. Unlike the Convention on Biological Diversity,9 9
where 90% of the world's states are parties,100 the 60% participation in
the Basel Convention seems too slight to conclude that the treaty cre-
ates instant custom. Here too we might note that the absence of a ma-
jor pertinent state may be considered more significant in cases where
general participation involves only a modest majority of states. We
cannot say, however, that the 60% participation is an insignificant
number, particularly when a considerable percentage of pertinent
states participate in the treaty.
This is a close call; if the United States does pass the necessary
domestic legislation and become a party to the treaty, the strong stand
taken by the pertinent states might then be sufficient to conclude that
the Basel Convention formulates instant custom. Similarly, if the per-
centage of states ratifying the treaty increases, there would again be
reason to suspect that the treaty formulates instant custom. At pres-
ent, however, the issue seems too close to conclude safely that the con-
sensus required to generate customary law is in evidence. Conse-
quently, we will leave this treaty in the doubtful category. In any
event, it is a relatively new treaty and seems to be well on its way to
meeting our three part test for inclusion into Category II.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") came into force on July 1, 1975.101
There are 145 Parties worldwide to CITES.102 We have not included
CITES among those treaties not allowing reservations because while
reservations to the general provisions of the Convention are prohibited,
allowance is made for reservations pertaining to specific species of wild
fauna and flora as listed in the Appendices to the Convention. 103 It is
difficult to say if this provision should disqualify this treaty from being
formative of customary international law, or whether the reservation
provision is sufficiently specific to call for a relaxation of our no reserva-
tions test. One could argue for the latter, because it is highly unlikely
that the specific species lists in the appendices are sufficiently gener-
alizable to formulate customary international law.104 On the other
hand, states have made rather extensive use of the reservations to the
99. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 44.
100. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
101. CITES, supra note 22.
102. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
103. CITES, supra note 22. Article XXIII, paragraph 1 of CITES states, inter alia,
"[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not be subject to general reservations.
Specific reservations may be entered in accordance with the provisions of this Article and
Articles XV and XVI." Id. at art. XXIII, para 1. Paragraph 3 goes on to state that "[u]ntil
a Party withdraws its reservation entered under the provisions of this Article, it shall be
treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the par-
ticular species or parts or derivatives specified in such reservation." Id. at para. 3.
104. According to Article XXIII, paragraph 3, a party having as reservation will be
treated as not being a party to the treaty with respect to that particular species until such
time as the reservation is withdrawn. Id. at art. XXIII, para. 3.
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Appendices, and it could be argued that, therefore, the provision is suf-
ficiently broad so as to possibly negate the effects of the entire treaty.
10 5
As the name of the Convention indicates, its purpose is to insure
that certain species are protected from exploitation as a result of their
market value. Regulations throughout the Convention cover both the
exporting states and importing states. That the Convention itself in-
tends to develop customary international law on this subject is evi-
denced by the inclusion of regulations covering non-party states. Arti-
cle X of CITES, "Trade with States Not Party to the Convention,"
requires that trade with non-party states ". . . substantially conform
with the requirements of the present Convention. .". "106 With over 70%
of the world's states as parties to CITES,107 sufficient numbers are pre-
sent to fulfill our criterion of widespread acceptance.
Analyzing the "pertinent states" condition under CITES is some-
what more difficult. Obviously in the case of trade in endangered spe-
cies, both importing and exporting states fill the role of pertinent states.
Although not all potential importing and exporting states are parties to
the treaty there would seem to be sufficient numbers of both developing
states and developed states to satisfy our pertinent states condition.
Moreover, CITES continues to gain parties, perhaps partly because its
provisions are extended even to non-parties and also because of global
pressure regarding the trade in endangered species.10 8 Between April
1996 and February 1999, an additional fifteen states became parties to
CITES.109 Thus the question regarding the no reservations test would
seem to provide the greatest difficulty in determining with certainty if
CITES qualifies as a treaty that is formative of customary international
law.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the 41 global multilateral environmental trea-
ties that are included in our study reveals that only ten of them meet
our no-reservations test. Of these ten, we judged that eight definitely
105. By 1992, reservations had been made by 17 states regarding 17 taxa in Appen-
dix I, by 4 states regarding 23 taxa in Appendix II, and by 11 states regarding 12 taxa in
Appendix III. Sand, supra note 16, at 80.
106. CITES, supra, note 22, at 251.
107. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 47.
108. "A major factor influencing the decision of many countries to become parties to
CITES is the pressure that stems from adverse publicity about illegal or harmful wildlife
trade and about the mortality of animals in the large-scale pet trade." Sand, supra note
16, at 81.
109. The sixteen states with their dates of ratification are: Mongolia, April 4, 1996;
Saudi Arabia, June 10, 1996; Georgia, Dec. 12, 1996; Turkey, Dec. 22, 1996; Latvia, May
12, 1997; Swaziland, May 27, 1997; Jamaica, June 22, 1997; Yemen, Aug. 3, 1997;
Myanmar, Sept. 11, 1997; Cambodia, Oct. 2, 1997; Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 6, 1997;
Uzbekistan, Oct. 8, 1997; Fiji, Dec. 29, 1997; Mauritania, June 11, 1998; Azerbaijan, Feb.
21, 1999.
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satisfied our three part test. We determined that the remaining two
treaties were in the doubtful category. This means, then, that only
eight of the 41 relevant multilateral treaties can be considered to create
instant customary international law binding on all states, regardless of
their non-participation in them.'1 0
It might be argued that the record of compliance with this instant
customary international law is not good. Some of the treaties that we
have included in our Category II do not have good records of compliance
either from the parties or the non-parties. But, this is not the question
that has concerned us here. Rather, we have explored the issue of obli-
gations created for states on the basis of the formation of instant cus-
tom. Our three part test has taken a rather conservative view of the
formation of customary international environmental law through the
treaty process as evidenced by the exceedingly small number of treaties
that we think qualify as customary law creating instruments. Our test
merely points to those customary environmental law principles by
which states should consider themselves bound. Whether they comply
with these principles is a different question entirely. Attempting to add
some certainty to the nature of customary legal obligations in interna-
tional environmental law, nonetheless, should prove valuable in clari-
fying the network of binding legal obligations that exist in this issue
area.
110. Oscar Schachter took an opposite view in 1991 when he wrote, "[e]nvironmental
treaties, though numerous, are limited in scope and in participation. On the whole, they
are not accepted as expressions of customary law and are regarded as binding for the par-
ties alone." Schachter, supra note 1, at 462.. Participation in certain of these treaties,
however, has grown considerably since 1991 and, as our discussions above indicate, the
scope covered by these environmental treaties has grown as well.

